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Abstract
Malware analysts face novel challenges related to increasing number of malware variants
emerging every year. With new emerging malware types, families and variants, conven-
tional classification of binaries into benign and malicious became inefficient and needs re-
finement when it comes to detecting similar functionality. Microsoft Windows is considered
to be one of the most targeted OS by malware developers through the development of PE32
files that look similar to system files. Static files analysis for malware detection is losing
efficiency due to extensive utilization of obfuscation, encryption and polymorphic when an
anti-virus is no longer able to detect the malware. Thus, it is important to explore sources
of multiple dynamic characteristics that can substantially improve similarity-based mal-
ware detection through indicators of compromise from disk, network and memory artefacts.
This paper suggests an approach for the reliable multifamily malware classification using
dynamic characteristics from community-accepted Cuckoo Sandbox. The best-achieved
classification results using Random Forest was 87.5% for 10 malware families using infor-
mation about modified and opened registry keys, created and modified files, loaded DLLs
and the resolved hosts. This result, however, can be further improved by adding more
dynamic features or combine in combination with selected static features in the future.
1 Introduction
With the rise of the Internet the distribution of malware is simpler as ever before. Thus, the
malware landscape is constantly evolving and malware analysts face the challenge of increasing
number of malware every year. The statistics diverge from source to source but they have
an increase in numbers in common as summarised in Fig. 1 for the total amount of malware
and the amount of new malware in the last ten years by the independent IT-Security institute
AV-TEST [3]. According to the statistics from AV-TEST, there have been 121.67 million new
malware samples found from a total amount of 719.15 million in 2017. This means that 16.9%
of the malware found in 2017 is considered to be new malware samples. The number of new
malicious files processed by Kaspersky Lab’s in-lab detection technologies reached 360,000 a day
in 2017, which is 11.5% more than the previous year [16]. As malicious data increases, it is
only natural that malware analysts are overwhelmed with the sheer amount of malware samples
at some point. It is too cumbersome to analyse every single malware. Therefore, there is a
big demand for automatic solutions which don’t require the analysts to go through every single
malware manually.
A signature-based detection approach is the main technique used for malware detection
by anti-virus programs [21, 2] with a conventional classification of Windows PE32 executa-
bles into malicious and benign. Binary classification is usually done with signatures, partial
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Figure 1: Statistic for the total amount of malware and the amount of new malware in the last
ten years [3, 14]
matching, regular expressions or heuristics [27]. This clustering approach is no longer suffi-
cient because e.g. of malware diversification [27] which focuses on avoiding similarity-based
matching of malware by randomly diversifying code and data regions to reduce the similarity
between malware mutants. Therefore, malware classification needs refinement when it comes
to detecting similar functionality malware samples belonging to the same category. Moreover,
static signature-based detection of malware is obsolete and becomes less relevant every year
with growing malware threats. Multinomial malware detection and classification based on dy-
namic indicators of compromise from memory, disk and network, which could substantially
improve anti-malware solutions, need to be explored and enhanced. Another challenge for the
anti-malware infrastructure is the absence of agreement between anti-virus vendors on how the
malware should be named. E.g. uploading a hash value from the WannaCry Decryptor (MD5:
7bf2b57f2a205768755c07f238fb32cc) to the online scan engine VirusTotal results in many dif-
ferent naming conventions of the various anti-virus software.
This paper will cover an important aspect of this problem by addressing the issue of malware
classification. The goal of this contribution is to explore a way to improve such classification
by exploiting available dynamic characteristics. Instead of doing a binary malware classifica-
tion into malicious and benign, malware is classified into a respective sub-group based on its
functionality and targeted activities. An experiment based on existing open-source tools will
be conducted throughout this paper in which malware is dynamically analysed and based on
dynamic features from memory, disk and network classified into its respective family. The
paper is organized as following. The Section 2 presents overview of the aspects of the auto-
mated malware detection, particularly machine learning-aided. Section 3 gives insight into the
methodology used to perform practical evaluation of the suggested approach described in the
Section 4. The sults are analysed in the Section 5 The conclusions are given in the Section 6.
2 Automated malware detection: current State of the Art
This section provides an overview of the contemporary malware detection techniques with
affiliated information needed to understand the challenges in multinomial malware classification.
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2.1 Static and Dynamic Analysis
Current academic literature describes two general approaches to perform malware analysis:
static and dynamic [5, 40, 8]. Both types roughly accomplish the same goal of describing how
the analysed malware works as well as the needed time and skill. However, the analysing tools
used to achieve this goal are quite different from each other [8]. Static analysis is an exami-
nation method for malicious software without any execution [40] using static properties: bytes,
opcodes and API n-grams frequencies, properties of Portable Executable header [and] strings
(e.g. command line commands, URLs etc) [5]. Moreover, a code analysis can be performed by
actually viewing the malicious code with the help of disassemblers and decompilers to gain a
better comprehension of the malware functionalities [8]. Static malware analysis is often com-
monly referred to as signature-based malware detection in which a cryptographic hash value or
checksum is calculated and compared to existing data, an approach used by AV-vendors [14].
Dynamic analysis, also called behavioural analysis, describes the process of executing the mal-
ware in a safe and controlled environment, like a virtual machine or a specialised sandbox such
as Cuckoo. While executing the malware, the malicious activities are being captured which
include patterns of a registry, network and disk usage, monitoring of API-calls, tracing of exe-
cuted instructions, investigation of memory layout and so on [5]. In real life scenarios static and
dynamic malware analysis are often both used in combination, a so-called hybrid technique [9].
However, static and dynamic analysis can also be done fully automatic to generate information
about analysed malware. In real case scenarios, a human analyst will use the automatically
gathered data to perform a manual analysis on top.
From the industrial solutions perspective, the main approach used for malware detection
is a collection of signatures, regularly delivered to end-point application. Those signatures in-
clude versatile description and patterns of the system artifacts that malicious software leave on
the system upon execution and while running. There exist a large number anti-virus solutions
offering a wide range of functionality for end-point and corporate threats detection and protec-
tion [32]. Even though, one can find frameworks for labelling and threat indicators exchange,
authors [24, 23] identified multiple inconsistencies when it comes to labelling of malware sam-
ples. It was concluded that the naming from different anti-virus vendors is not consistent and
might not always be considered as a ground truth. The detection accuracy and the overall
coverage needs further evaluation on novel malware samples.
2.2 Evasion Techniques
Malware authors try to make their malware as unnoticeable to the victim as possible. For
automated malware detection and classification systems, it can be a great challenge to cope
with such evasion techniques. Especially because it is also possible for malware to use different
evasion techniques concurrently [29].
Obfuscation. Obfuscation techniques aim to change the malware code in a way that its
either not possible anymore to determine a correlation to other malware or to make conventional
detection methods unable to find malicious indicators. There are a lot of different obfuscation
techniques [29, 19, 42] in order to make basic signature-based detection nearly impossible or to
increase analysis time. A static feature approach can be easily bypassed by obfuscation methods
[15].
Anti-Analysis. Malware analysts often use designed tools and software to work with. This
is, of course, a commonly known fact, also to malware authors. Special evasion techniques have
been developed to detect such proof of ongoing analysis. The malware checks for certain indi-
cators which suggest that the malware is being examined by an analyst. Anti-VM techniques
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are used to detect registry keys, installed tools, processes and services, serial numbers or MAC
addresses, system memory structure and hardware parameter related to virtual environments
indicating that the malware is being executed in a sandbox [19, 36]. Another popular evasion
technique among malware authors is anti-tools. The malware checks for indication that com-
monly used analysis software such as the monitoring tools Wireshark or Process Explorer are
installed on the system or running as process [36]. The ransomware/cryptominer Rakhni for
instance, has a list of more than [sic] 150 names of tools used for process monitoring and anal-
ysis; if one of the running processes is in that list, Rakhni will hide its malicious behaviour [6];
[Supposed to be "than"]. Anti-Debugging techniques are used for detecting present Debuggers,
a software to diagnose and locate errors in computer systems, used to give full control to the
malware analyst over the run-time behaviour of the analysed malware. Malware can detect if
it is executed in debug-mode in different ways. An easy approach is to check if the Windows
API IsDebuggerPresent() is invoked [41].
Polymorphic & Metamorphic Malware. The encryption is a viable evasion technique
used by malware authors to avoid detection. The malware typically consists of the encrypted
payload and the decryptor recovering the payload during run time. By using a different key
for each infection, the malware ensures a different payload signature. However, constant de-
cryptor makes this approach unsuitable in the long run.Tools such as The Mutation Engine,
DAME and TPE [33] exist to help malware authors to transform a non-obfuscated malware
into a polymorph without any considerable expenditure. Metamorphic malware uses obfusca-
tion techniques to mutate itself in order to produce malware variants [25] without sacrificing
functionality [10]. While Polymorphic malware has similar memory indicators and uses tra-
ditional malware elements for encryption, metamorphic malware varies in memory for each
variant and use different encryption elements [10].
2.3 Machine Learning in Automated Multinomial Malware Classifi-
cation
Machine learning (ML) is used today in many different scientific areas. ML algorithms are used
to learn from examples of sample data, also known as training data, to build a mathematical
model. After completion of the training phase, the model can make predictions or decisions
on the test set by recognising patterns and regularities without ever learning the sample data
by heart. This allows the system to also evaluate previously unknown data. Moreover, various
classifiers can be applied to machine learning algorithms to build a classification model. We
have looked into the most recent previous work and the main attributes and achievements are
represented in Table 1. It lists the most relevant references for multinomial malware classifica-
tion with the used features and their extraction technique, the utilised sample size, the applied
classification method and the obtained performance.
It can be seen that most of the recent literature deals with either static features, which can
fail, or dynamic features from disk and network. Memory features are often not included in
multinomial malware classification due to their volatile nature which makes them difficult to
obtain. However, there is also no distinct clarification of which dynamic features are useful for
multi-class malware classification. Moreover, there is no clear assessment of the performance
difference between static and dynamic features. Therefore, this paper works towards a possi-
ble solution to those issues in the future. Specific dynamic features, including some selected
memory-based features, are extracted and used for classification purposes while static features
from the same malware samples are used for reliable performance comparison.
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3 Multinomial classification of Windows PE32: Methodol-
ogy
Conventional signature-based malware detection and ML-aided detection with the help of static
features fail. Thus, dynamic features from disk, memory and network are used to overcome
some of those limitations of static malware analysis. As long as the overall functionalities of
the malware stay the same, the dynamic indicators of compromise observed on the system and
network are highly alike. This means that dynamic features are resistant to evasion techniques
to a certain point.
3.1 Data Set
To test the classification algorithms, later on, it was used a set 9,823 Windows PE32 files of
top 10 most frequent labelled malware categories, as indicated by Shalaginov et al. [34, 12].
The data set was provided by the NTNU Malware Lab but originally the malware samples
were retrieved through Maltrieve [18], VirusShare [31] VxHeaven [26], labelled with VirusTotal.
This includes malware from the following families: Agent, Hupigon, Obfuscator, Onlinegames,
Renos, Small, Vb, Vbinject, Vundo, Zlob. Behavioural indicators of compromise are extracted,
generated by dynamic malware analysis. Based on those characteristics, the malware samples
are being classified into groups concerning their similarities. The experiment will be conducted
with the help of the existing open-source tools Cuckoo Sandbox as dynamic analysis system
and machine learning algorithms from Weka library.
3.2 Data pre-processing and analysis
The family labels mentioned above were retrieved from Microsoft using the CARO naming
scheme, for malware which was positively identified by VirusTotal. Moreover, malware with
anti-VM or anti-debug features will be removed from the actual dynamic analysis in a pre-
processing phase because those samples could heavily skew the outcome of the experiment.
Cuckoo Sandbox offers a controlled environment in which the malware can safely be executed.
After each execution of malware the features will be extracted and the virtual machine will get
reverted to a clean state, a snapshot. According to this methodology, every malware sample
will be analysed and the features will be extracted. Afterwards, the results have to be prepared
for the classification. In this phase, the malware will be classified based on the extracted
characteristics with the help of machine learning algorithms. To achieve this, the machine
learning model is trained with a part of the behavioural features obtained from the dynamic
analysis. Afterwards, the remaining data is used to test the accuracy of the algorithm. A basic
process flowchart of the method of the experiment is visualised in Fig. 2.
3.3 Feature Extraction
The quality of extracted features will influence the outcome of the experiment the most. There-
fore, we focused on the most relevant and promising characteristics listed below.
Dynamic features. The following characteristics are extracted in a contemporary Win-
dows malware analysis for multinomial classification:
• Disk activities. Low-level file operations are extracted, which includes any kind of
file modification on the accessible disk storage such as reading, writing, deletion or other
modifying actions done by the malware. This also involves new files dropped to the system
6
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Figure 2: Process flowchart of the malware analysis process during the experiment based on
Banin et al. [4]
by the malware. Furthermore, registry patterns, describing changes of the operating
system (OS) configuration database [34], are examined. This includes access of specific
registries, registry keys read, modified or deleted and new keys or values added to the
registry. Moreover, dynamic-link libraries (DLL), loaded by the malware processes, are
extracted. In addition, mutexes on the file system are analysed and recorded since this
is a common approach by malware to lock access on specific resources but also to avoid
reinfecting the same host again.
• Network traffic. The whole network traffic produced by the malware is monitored,
stored as pcap file and the relevant network information, such as DNS traffic, IRC and
SMTP traffic, domains, IPs and HTTP as well as SSL/TLS encrypted HTTPS requests
are extracted. [13].
• Memory footprints. A lot of literature indicates that memory analysis is not very
trustworthy without ground-truth and it often shows reduced accuracy [34], which makes
memory patterns a possibly unreliable feature for malware classification. To examine
whether memory footprints can still be used as a dynamic feature for multinomial malware
classification they are included in this work nonetheless. Therefore, behavioural metrics,
such as average CPU and memory usage as well as the peak usage of those resources, are
measured.
Static features. In addition to dynamic features, static features from PEframe and Linux
tools will be used for classification with the same machine learning algorithms. The used
static features are [35]: pe_api, pe_debug, pe_packer, pe_library, pe_autogen, pe_object,
pe_executable, pe_text, pe_binary, pe_temporary, pe_database, pe_log, pe_webpage,
pe_backup, pe_cabinet, pe_data, pe_registry, pe_directories, pe_dll, pe_detected, size_TEXT,
size_DATA, size_OBJ, size_TOT, filesize. The detailed description of used static features is
given by Shalaginov et al. and Grini et al. [12]. In their study, the authors used features from
PEframe and Linux-based command line tools but also static-based features extracted from
VirusTotal. Since it can not be ruled out that the features from VirusTotal might have been
created with additional intelligent pre-processing, they are excluded from the dataset used in
the second experiment. This is done in order to guarantee an unbiased comparison between
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static and dynamic features extracted in an experiment of the same tool-based level.
3.4 Feature Selection
All the behavioural features are then used to classify the malware into their respective families.
Therefore, the extracted features are fed to machine learning algorithms. Weka also provides the
ability to rank features and find feature combinations. The most common metrics for feature
selection (FS) methods are [12]: Correlation, Information Gain, Learner. With feature selection
it can be determined which features and which feature combinations are the most suitable for
multinomial malware classification, reducing complexity of the intelligent model [7].
4 Experimental Design
This section demonstrates the technical execution of the methodology for reproducibility of the
use case.
Sandbox-related Configuration Details. Cuckoo Sandbox has to be configured accord-
ing to its documentation [13] alongside some small customisations. Thus, a Windows 7 virtual
machine with the virtualisation software VirtualBox from Oracle is set up and configured. Win-
dows 7 was chosen because it is the best supported operating system by Cuckoo Sandbox as
recommended by their manual [13]. A virtual network, attached to the host OS as ’Host-only
Adapter’, between host and guest system is used in order to make it as hard as possible for
the malware to escape its controlled environment. Consequently, no tools, such as ’VirtualBox
Guest Additions’, are installed that could allow the malware to leak potentially harmful code
to the host system.
In addition, a PowerShell script is saved on the guest machine which is being used to extract
memory features such as CPU and memory usage during the malware execution. Lastly, a snap-
shot of the machine state must be created. On the host system there are several tools to provide
additional functionality for the malware analysis such as INetSim, Tcpdump and mitmproxy.
Malware often requires an Internet connection to function properly and will therefore mostly
not run when disconnected. To cope with this, a fake internet connection with INetSim is set
up on the host system communicating with the malware during execution by providing simu-
lation of common internet services. Tcpdump is then used to dump such network behaviour of
the malware. In case of a malware performing SSL encrypted requests over HTTPS, the tool
mitmproxy is used. This proxy pretends to the server and client to be its counterpart in the
form of a Man-in-the-Middle. Fig. 3 shows a simplified model of the Cuckoo architecture used
in the experiment.
Dynamic Malware Analysis and Feature Extraction. The remaining 8,305 pre-
processed malware samples are then submitted to Cuckoo for the dynamic analysis. Cuckoo
assigns every sample with a unique task ID and then invokes the guest machine for the anal-
ysis over the configured virtual network and reverts it to the previously created snapshot. A
Cuckoo agent, programmed in Python, that works over the network is used to transfer data be-
tween host and guest by using the XMLRPC protocol. A malware sample is transferred to the
guest machine. In this controlled environment, the sample is executed alongside the PowerShell
script. During the execution, Cuckoo examines all changes made to the system or connection
attempts to the outside world while the PowerShell analysis the CPU and RAM usage. Once
Cuckoo is done analysing a sample, the results are being extracted to the host system with the
Cuckoo agent and reported by different reporting modules. Various logs, reports and dumps
are generated and combined in a JSON-format report.
8
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Figure 3: Cuckoo’s main architecture used in the experiments [13]
Data Processing. 9,823 Windows PE32 malware samples were originally received for
malware classification. After a pre-processing phase, 8,305 samples remained. With the auto-
mated malware analysis system Cuckoo Sandbox the remaining samples were executed inside
a controlled environment, a virtual machine. For each malware sample the dynamic features
were extracted and stored in a report. After the error removal phase 7,009 reports of malware
samples remained for classification. The extracted features were put together in a single file,
readable for the machine learning library Weka. Therefore, the name of the features was stored
in the attribute section while the number of individual occurrences was saved as data points.
Selected metrics of feature selection methods were used to rank the features and to analyse the
individual contribution of each feature. Moreover, static features of the same 7,009 malware
samples were used to compare their results to the performance of the dynamic features.
A Python script creates the specific file format by writing the dynamic feature names
into the attribute section and the values into the data section. The values of the data
section concerning the memory features are the actual percentage of CPU and RAM us-
age during malware execution. The final set of extracted 31 features: Network Fea-
tures: connects_host, connects_ip, downloads_file, fetches_url, resolves_host. Memory
Features: averageCPU, averageRAM, peakCPU, peakRAM. Disk Features: command_line,
directory_created, directory_enumerated, directory_removed, dll_loaded, regkey_deleted,
regkey_opened, regkey_read, regkey_written, file_copied, file_created, file_deleted, file_exists,
file_failed, file_moved, file_opened, file_read, file_recreated, file_written, guid, mutex,
wmi_query.
Application of Feature Selection and Machine Learning. The created file can then
be fed to Weka, where the features are ranked, selected and classified in their respective families.
To find the best classifier and combination of features, Weka has some built-in functions for
attribute selection and functionally for feature ranking and correlation. The various metrics
for feature selection methods that are used: Correlation, Information Gain and Best Subset.
Further, the commonly used classifiers presented are used for the classification alongside a 10
fold cross-validation approach as a test option. Cross-validation is deployed because the data,
used for training and testing a machine learning algorithm, should never be derived from the
9
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same sample set.
5 Results & Analysis
This section represents the analysis of the feature selection and multinomial classification. Table
2 show the most commonly used classifiers for malware classification with machine learning and
their true positive (TP) and false positive (FP) rate, the F-measure. All values in both tables
represent the calculated weighted average to combine the individual results per class
5.1 Dynamic Features
The overall accuracy is not being listed because in the case of multi-class classification it is not
reliable since it’s not considering unbalanced sample distribution. Thus, the TP rate, calculated
as weighted average, is considered as performance indicators of the model. Moreover, 10-fold
cross-validation was used as test option.
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate F-Measure ROC Area
Naive Bayes 0.338 0.079 0.303 0.767
SVM 0.525 0.073 0.494 0.787
ANN 0.641 0.047 0.635 0.871
1-nearest Neighbours 0.677 0.04 0.676 0.817
Logistic Regression 0.691 0.042 0.677 0.921
J48 0.842 0.018 0.841 0.932
Random Forest 0.873 0.015 0.872 0.984
Table 2: Weighted average of different classifiers with amount-based approach classification of
dynamic features
It can be easily seen that the Random Forest classifier achieves the best results in both the
binary and the amount-based classification approach.
Table 3 presents the results for feature selection methods The goal of finding the best subset
is to simplify and to speed up the classification process. Fig. 4 visualises those results. Green
indicates the first ten ranked features, orange is used to display the second ten features and red
lists all features ranked as last eleven. The two features dll_loaded and regkey_written have a
green label for all three metrics of feature selection. The features file_created and file_written
are highly ranked in Correlation and Information Gain feature selection but are not part of
the best subset of features. Regkey_opened performs quite good with a green label for Learner
and Information Gain and an orange label for Correlation, as well as resolves_host with two
green labels and the orange label for Information Gain. Directory_enumerated, regkey_read,
file_exists and download_file have two green and one red label indicating a decent performance
as well. Directory_removed, file_copied, wmi_query and connects_ip perform the worst with
two red labels for Correlation and Information Gain while also not being part of the best subset.
PreakRam, averageRam and regkey_deleted make up the second-worst group with one orange
and one red label while also not being part of the best subset of features.
Since the Correlation-based feature selection for the amount-based classification approach
with the Random Forest classifier achieves the best overall results, the confusion matrix is
represented in the Figure 5. The confusion matrix visualises the true labels against the predicted
10
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Correlation Information Gain Best Subset (Learner)
resolves_host (0.17) regkey_read (1.342) regkey_written
downloads_file (0.121) regkey_opened (1.205) dll_loaded
dll_loaded (0.116) file_exists (1.076) regkey_opened
guid (0.108) dll_loaded (0.984) file_exists
peakCPU (0.107) regkey_written (0.897) file_failed
file_created (0.09) directory_enumerated (0.846) regkey_read
directory_created (0.088) file_opened (0.702) directory_enumerated
command_line (0.087) file_created (0.674) resolves_host
file_written (0.085) file_read (0.626) downloads_file
regkey_written (0.077) file_written (0.521) averageCPU
Table 3: Feature selection methods of dynamic characteristics: 10 top features with correspond-
ing feature evaluation metric value
Figure 4: Correlation between the dynamic features and the three used feature selection meth-
ods. Colour key: green = 1-10; orange = 11-20; red = 21-31
labels from the machine learning algorithm for each malware family. It can be seen that the three
families agent, hupigon and obfuscator perform the worst with a true positive rate of 0.7 and
below. The confusion matrix shows a high false negative and false positive rate between those
three mentioned families. Moreover, malware samples from the agent family are mistakenly
predicted as a member of the small, vb and vbinject family, as well as samples from the small
family predicted to be of the agent family. In addition, the vb and vbinject families have some
confusion worth mentioning.
Examining the performance of each malware family presented in the confusion matrix (Fig.
5) identifies that not all malware families perform the same. Some families are apparently
easier to classify and some aren’t. The threshold is set to discard classes on 80% TP rate.
The vb family will still be considered since its performance is just over the necessary threshold.
However, the three worst-performing malware families agent, hupigon, obfuscator, which all are
located below the threshold.
5.2 Static features
The second experiment with the static features achieves an overall performance of 86.7% without
any feature selection methods applied. The TP rates per class are: agent: 0.63; hupigon: 0.63;
obfuscator: 0.84; onlinegames: 0.94; renos: 0.97; small: 0.84; vb: 0.79; vbinject: 0.9; vundo:
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Figure 5: Confusion matrix for Random Forest classifier and Correlation-based feature selection
of dynamic features
0.93; zlob: 0.98.
To analyse the static features even further, the best eight features, provided by Correlation
and Information Gain , and the Best Subset of features are presented in Table 4.
Correlation Information Gain Learner
pe_detected (0.21) filesize (1.75) pe_api
pe_packer (0.20) size_TOT (1.47) pe_library
filesize (0.14) size_TEXT (1.41) pe_detected
pe_api (0.13) size_DATA (1.3) size_DATA
pe_library (0.12) pe_api (0.92) size_TOT
size_TOT (0.10) pe_library (0.7) filesize
size_DATA (0.09) pe_packer (0.61)
size_TEXT (0.07) pe_detected (0.34)
0.870 0.870 0.866
Table 4: Feature selection methods of static features
5.3 Performance comparison
To get a better and simpler comparison of the performance of static and dynamic features, the
true positive rates are visualised in Fig. 6. It compares the dynamic and the static features by
class against each other based on their true positive rates from the Correlation-based feature
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selection method. It can be seen that the dynamic features are either on the same level or
better than the static features for all families except for the obfuscator family which performs
far better with static features.
Figure 6: Per-class comparison of TP rates from Correlation-based feature selection of static
against dynamic features
Table 4 shows that from the best performing static features only the feature pe_dll is
used in the dynamic approach. This means that the static features could add another level
of abstraction to the classification results of the dynamic features. Therefore, merging the
dynamic with the static features results in an even higher true positive rate of 0.923. Looking
at the best performing features based on the three metrics for feature selection, it can be seen
that the features are ranked by a combination of their individual ranking from Table 3 and
Table 4:
Correlation: resolves_host, pe_detected, pe_packer, downloads_file, pe_api, dll_loaded,
guid, peakCPU, pe_library, filesize, file_created
Information Gain: regkey_read, filesize, regkey_opened, file_exists, size_TOT, dll_loaded,
size_TEXT, regkey_written, directory_enumerated, size_DATA, file_opened
Best Subset: pe_api, pe_detected, size_DATA, size_TOT, filesize, regkey_written,
regkey_opened, file_exists, regkey_read, directory_enumerated, resolves_host
6 Discussions and Conclusions
While the static features achieved an overall True Positive Rate of 87%, an F-measure value of
0.869 and a AUC of 0.985, the dynamic features achieved True Positive Rate of 87.5%, an F-
measure value of 0.875 and a AUC of 0.985. Even though this performance gain seems small on
malware without evasion techniques, it has to be considered that dynamic features, unlike static
features, are not susceptible to obfuscation techniques. Hence, the best performing dynamic
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features for multinomial malware classification are the modified and opened registry keys, the
created and modified files, the loaded DLLs and the resolved hosts.
Used dynamic features for multinomial malware classification achieved a good performance,
however, they could have been used in a different structure, as suggested by multiple recent
literature. For example, the exact value of the called APIs, the modified registry keys or the
queried WMIs could have been taken instead of the total amount as a single value. Another
approach could involve certain sequences of API calls or loaded DLLs instead of the overall
number of occurrences or a different weighting of features, since some API calls. Furthermore,
the used memory features can be improved in precision and extraction. Instead of just consider-
ing the first ten seconds of the running malware process, a different or longer time frame could
have been analysed as well as another extraction method instead of a PowerShell module. In
addition, other memory features have to be analysed on their performance towards multinomial
malware classification. Such features could be, for example, the number of spawned processes
by the malware. Cuckoo’s monitor could be used for this since it follows the malware through
all processes either generated or taken over by it.
More research towards automated malware analysis systems with the ability to run obfus-
cated malware samples has to be done in the future. For example, the software VMCloak,
programmed and maintained by one of the developers of Cuckoo Sandbox, aims to target this
issue. Amongst other things it tries to make the set up virtual machine more difficult to detect
with conventional ways.
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